Maryland Intellectual Property Lawyer & Attorney : Brian Wm. Higgins : Serving Baltimore, Columbia, Frederick

     "eBay tumbled Tiffany's carefully stacked legal arguments," writes law professor and Counterfeit Chic blogger Susan Scafidi.  On Monday, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York held that eBay is not liable to Tiffany & Co. for the sale of counterfeit goods through its auction website. The court ruled that Tiffany, and similar companies, are ultimately responsible for policing their trademarks online, rather than auction-based companies like eBay. "The court's ruling is in line with well established legal precedent which holds that the obligation to enforce trademarks rests with the trademark holder," wrote eBay in a published statement on its website Monday. 

     You win one, you lose one. In stark contrast to the findings of the New York court, just a few weeks ago the Tribunal de Commerce court in Paris ordered Ebay to pay over $60 million dollars to Louis Vuitton and Christian Dior for allowing the sale of counterfeit merchandise through the company's auction website. The Paris court described eBay's anti-counterfeit measures as "empty."  The court concluded that eBay had committed "serious errors" in permitting the sale of counterfeit goods, which, the court found, violated Louis Vuitton and Christian Dior's copyrights and trademarks. eBay is apparently appealing the ruling. In a published statement on its website, eBay characterized Louis Vuitton's and Christian Dior's lawsuit as an "overreaching...attempt to impose, in France, a business model that restricts consumer choice through an anti-competitive business practice."

 

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     In Grand Canyon West Ranch v. Hualapai Tribe, TTAB No. 91162008 (June 30, 2008), the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board found that an applicant, not registrant, committed fraud on the Trademark Office when it represented to the Office that it provided services in association with its mark GRAND CANYON WEST that, in fact, it did not offer. 

     Applicant Hualapai Tribe ("People of the Tall Pine"), whose tribal lands border the Colorado River and Grand Canyon in the western portion of the Canyon, filed an application for the mark GRAND CANYON WEST for a variety of services under Section 1(a), App. Ser. No. 76484111. The examiner prosecuting the application issued an office action requesting further clarification as to the services associated with the mark. The applicant responded in kind, stating that it provided, among other services, horseback rides, bicycle tours, and tractor-based tram rides. During the publication phase, the mark was opposed by Grand Canyon West Ranch, which argued that the mark was merely descriptive, and that the applicant had committed fraud on the PTO by including services in the application that they were not, in fact, offering under the mark.

     The Board found that the mark was not merely descriptive. However, it agreed with Ranch's fraud argument. Specifically, the Board found that there was no evidence that applicant provided horseback rides, bicycle tours, or tractor-based tram rides, as identified in the application. The applicant argued that the error was inadvertent, that it was due to innocent and reasonable reliance on the examiner's instructions to applicant suggesting appropriate services. The Board said that it could not excuse the error. The applicant, it wrote, had an affirmative duty to correct the identification set forth in the examiner's amendment if it contained errors. 

      Acknowledgment: information for this post provided by Alain Lapter, Esq.

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• Nacre AS v. Silynx Communications, Inc., No. 07-cv-02676, filed Oct. 2, 2007; assigned to J. Williams.

     Plaintiff Nacre AS is a Norwegian company that alleges ownership of U.S. registered trademark QUIETPRO, as well as U.S. Patent No. 7,039,195 (“Ear Terminal”) and U.S. Patent No. 6,567,524 (“Noise Protection Verification Device”). In September 2007, Nacre filed a trademark opposition proceeding against Rockville, MD-based Silynx Communications' QUIETOPS mark before the U.S. Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. That proceeding was stayed when, in October 2007, Nacre filed the above lawsuit against Silynx and its CEO, Gil Limonchik, alleging trademark and patent infringement. On June 12, 2008, the infringement allegations against Limonchik were dismissed without prejudice. Memorandum and Opinion (June 12, 2008). Limonchik, who according to court papers was a former Nacre consultant, had filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim).

     In granting the motion as to Count I (trademark infringement), Judge Williams stated that in order for a trademark claim against a corporate officer to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must allege, in addition to a corporation's infringing activity, that the individual corporate officer played an active role in the infringing activity. In this case, Judge Williams found Nacre's complaint failed to state factual allegations to indicate what actions Limonchik had taken in an individual capacity to infringe upon the QUIETPRO (R) mark. The only relevant allegations in Nacre's complaint, Judge Williams said, were "Defendant have and are infringing the rights of Nacre in QUIETPRO (R) under 15 U.S.C. 1125 and the common law" and "Defendants' infringement of Nacre's rights in QUIETPRO (R) is and has been willful."  Neither of those statements mentioned what specific role Limonchik played in the infringement, Williams found.      

     In granting the motion as to Counts II and III (patent infringement), Judge Williams found Nacre's complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to preclude dismissal of these counts. No part of the complaint, he wrote, offered facts to justify piercing the corporate veil, to demonstrate Limonchik's specific intent or action to induce infringement or facts to support contributory infringement liability.

     Nacre's case is not completely lost, however. Judge Williams' dismissal was made, as noted above, without prejudice as to Nacre's right to amend its complaint to add more factual allegations:

"Plaintiff has walked a fine line in drafting the complaint. It is possible to conjecture facts which would support Defendant Limonchik's liability in this case. However, the law requires a plaintiff to allege enough facts to put the defendant on notice of the claims and the grounds for those claims. Here, Plaintiff has not stated clear grounds for the claims alleged in the complaint."

     Judge Williams noted that "[Limonchik] has not offered any evidence that he would be prejudiced by an amendment [of the complaint], that an amendment would be futile, or that Plaintiff engaged in undue delay. * * * Defendant asks for dismissal with prejudice solely on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts."

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     In Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., No. 06-2662 (D. Md. May 29, 2008), U.S. Chief Magistrate Judge Grimm describes the proper means for asserting that documents are protected or immune from discovery because of the attorney-client privilege or attorney work product doctrine. Judge Grimm's explanation comes at the end of his opinion in Victor Stanley, published two weeks ago.

The Issue

     Because a party responding to a Rule 34 request for the production of discovery is entitled to refuse to produce documents if they are privileged or work product protected, Judge Grimm pointed out that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that when doing so, the responding party must “describe the nature of the documents, communications, or tangible things not produced or disclosed--and do so in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the claim.” The most common way to do this, he wrote, is by using a privilege log, which identifies

1. Each document withheld,
2. Information regarding the nature of the privilege/protection claimed,
3. The name of the person making/receiving the communication,
4. The date and place of the communication, and
5. The document’s general subject matter.

What Really Happens?

     In actuality, Judge Grimm, who in his position as Magistrate referees all kinds of discovery disputes, found that lawyers infrequently provide all the basic information called for in a privilege log, and if they do, it is usually so cryptic that the log falls far short of its intended goal of providing sufficient information to the reviewing court to enable a determination to be made regarding the appropriateness of the privilege/protection asserted without resorting to extrinsic evidence or in camera review of the documents themselves. Few judges, he said, find that the privilege log is ever sufficient to make the discrete fact-findings needed to determine whether a privilege/protection was properly asserted and not waived.

What Should Lawyers Be Doing? 

     According to Judge Grimm, parties should be wary of filing a response to a Rule 34 document production request that asserts privilege/protection as a basis for refusing to make requested production without having a factual basis to support each element of each privilege/protection claimed for each document withheld, because doing so is a sanctionable violation.

     Insuring that a privilege or protection claim is properly asserted in the first instance and maintained thereafter involves a several step process, Judge Grimm wrote.

(1)  First, pursuant to FRCP 26(b) (5), the party asserting privilege/protection must do so with particularity for each document, or category of documents, for which privilege/protection is claimed.

(2)  After that, if the requesting party challenges the sufficiency of the assertion of privilege/protection, the asserting party may no longer rest on the privilege log, but bears the burden of establishing an evidentiary basis–by affidavit, deposition transcript, or other evidence– for each element of each privilege/protection claimed for each document or category of document. A failure to do so warrants a ruling that the documents must be produced because of the failure of the asserting party to meet its burden.

(3)  If the asserting party makes this showing, and the requesting party still contests the assertion of privilege/protection, then the dispute is ready to submit to the court, which, after looking at the evidentiary support offered by the asserting party, can either rule on the merits of the claim or order that the disputed documents be produced for in camera inspection.

Result

     In Victor Stanley, Judge Grimm said that had he not ruled that Defendant's 165 inadvertently produced documents waived the privilege/protection status of the documents, then the effect of a failure by the Defendants to comply with the court’s order regarding the proper manner in which to assert privilege/protection would have warranted an order to produce the materials for failure to carry the burden of demonstrating the existence of the privilege/protection claimed. 

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     U.S. Chief Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm is a leading jurist in the field of electronic discovery. In Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., No. 06-2662 (D. Md. May 29, 2008), Judge Grimm discusses the approach the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland may take when deciding whether the inadvertent production to an adversary of attorney-client privileged or work-product protected materials constitutes a waiver.

Background

     In Victor, the parties entered into a joint protocol to search and retrieve relevant ESI responsive to Plaintiff’s Rule 34 requests.  After the protocol was used to retrieve responsive ESI, Defendants reviewed the documents to locate any that were privileged or attorney work-product prior to production to Plaintiff. Defendants had previously expressed concern that privilege review of the responsive documents would delay production unnecessarily and cause undue expense. To address this concern, Defendants gave their computer forensics expert a list of keywords to be used to search and retrieve privileged/protected documents. However, Defendants also acknowledged the possibility of inadvertent disclosure of privileged/protected documents, and requested that the court approve a “clawback agreement.” Later, Defendants notified the court that because Judge Garbis had extended the discovery deadline by four months, Defendants would be able to conduct a document-by-document privilege review, thereby making a clawback agreement unnecessary.

     After receiving Defendants’ ESI production in September, 2007, Plaintiff began their review of the materials. They soon discovered documents that potentially were privileged or work-product protected, and immediately segregated this information and notified Defendants.

Applicable Law

     As noted by Judge Grimm, courts have taken three different approaches when considering inadvertent production. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to decide which approach it will follow, although individual district courts within the circuit, Grimm notes, have adopted the intermediate balancing approach. Under the intermediate approach, the court balances a number of factors to determine whether the producing party exercised reasonable care under the circumstances to prevent against disclosure of privileged/protected information, and if so, there is no waiver. The intermediate test requires the court to balance the following factors to determine whether inadvertent production of attorney-client privileged materials waives the privilege:

(1) the reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure;

(2) the number of inadvertent disclosures;

(3) the extent of the disclosures;

(4) any delay in measures taken to rectify the disclosure; and

(5) overriding interests in injustice.

     Judge Grimm commented that decisions of the Fourth Circuit suggest that it is inclined to adopt the strict approach. Under the strict approach, there is a waiver because once disclosed there can no longer be any expectation of confidentiality.

Continue Reading...

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    The table below identifies the top 10 states having the most copyright, trademark, and patent lawsuits filed in their respective U.S. district courts during the first quarter of 2008 (source Justia.com). The numbers show that California had the most filings, followed by, in order, Texas, New York, Illinois, Florida, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, New Jersey, Ohio, and Michigan.  The table shows Maryland's ranking: 24th overall, but 15th for trademark and copyright filings. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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• #20: Staggs v. West, No. 8:2008cv00728; filed March 20, 2008; assigned to J. Messitte

     Dayna D. Staggs, III, a Prince Georges County, MD, resident and music recording artist who, as reported by On the Record, reportedly performs and produces under the alias D'Mystro, filed this copyright infringement lawsuit against singer Kanye West ("one of the worlds biggest Hip Hop Rap artist[s]") and co-defendants Roc-A-Fella Records, LLC, Good Music Carter Administration, Shawn Carter Records, LLC, and Broadcast Music Inc. (BMI) (representing individually several defendants), for allegedly using Staggs' 1984 sound recording and composition entitled "Volume of Good Life." In particular, Staggs alleges that,

"Kanye West didn't obtain a license to use 'Volume of Good life' which has repeated melody's and uncleared vocal samples and compositional parts of sound recording with drum elements, including (45) lyrics from the original volume of good life."

     According to the complaint, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) "reports that the Kayne West 'Good Life' master with mixed parts of 'Volume of Good Life' was a tremendous success, selling millions. Attaining multi-platinum status selling more then [sic] 5 million units." The Complaint goes on to allege that,

"The vulgar, sexual and racially-charged nature of the infringing master work is directly counter to Dayna D. Staggs long established public persona, utterly inconsistent with the musician, artist clean image , [sic] And harms the reputation of the Dayna D. Staggs Copyrighted Rock/Pop master work clean titled 'Volume of Good Life.'"

     Count I of the Complaint alleges copyright infringement, contributory infringement, and unfair competition in violation of the Lanham Act.  Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages, "impoundments."

     The Complaint appears to have been filed by Mr. Staggs pro se as CEO of Dayna Paryss Entertainment.

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• #19: CoStar Realty Information, Inc. v. Field, No. 8:2008cv00663; filed March 13, 2008; assigned to J. Williams

     This copyright lawsuit involves Plaintiffs CoStar Realty Information, Inc., and CoStar Group, Inc., which are Delaware companies with their principal places of business in Bethesda, MD, and Defendants Mark Field (allegedly a California resident and sole proprietor d/b/a Alliance Valuation Group), Lawson Valuation Group, Inc. (allegedly a Florida entity), Russ Gressett (allegedly a Texas resident d/b/a TGC Realty Counselors), Gerald A. Teel Company, Inc. (allegedly a Texas entity), and John Does 1-5. 

     Plaintiffs assert that they provide users with access to one of the most comprehensive commercial real estate information databases available. Alliance reportedly entered into a Licensing Agreement with CoStar to access CoStar's databases, but allegedly breached the agreement by providing user names and passcodes to Defendants Lawson, Gressett, Gateel, and Does 1-5. CoStar asserts, against one or more defendants, copyright infringement, criminal copyright infringement, breach of contract, fraud, and tortious interference with contract and prospective business relationship. With regard to the copyright infringement allegation, CoStar is seeking an award of statutory damages, as well as attorney's fees and costs.

     Shari Ross Lahlou of Crowell & Moring (Washington, DC) filed the complaint on behalf of CoStar.

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• #18: Sunoco, Inc. (R&M) v. IDK, Inc., No. 8:2008cv00605; filed March 6, 2008; assigned to J. Titus 

     Pennsylvania-based Sunoco, Inc., markets and distributes petroleum products, including motor fuels, to distributors and service stations in Maryland. According to its complaint, Defendants IDK, Inc., and IDK Properties are Maryland entities, and Defendant Kogod is a Maryland resident. Reportedly, Sunoco's predecessor in interest and one or more of the Defendants entered into a reseller agreement that permitted IDK to use certain of Plaintiffs' trade names, trademarks, and trade dress in connection with the sale of motor fuel at Defendants' premises. Plaintiff is alleging, among other things, infringement of the SUNOCO and SUN trademark, and deceptive trade practice in violation of Md. Code Ann., Com. Law §13-301(2)(i):

"Unfair or deceptive trade practices include any: (2) Representation that:
(i) Consumer goods, consumer realty, or consumer services have a sponsorship, approval, accessory, characteristic, ingredient, use, benefit, or quantity which they do not have."  

     Charles Carpenter of Pepper Hamilton LLP (Washington, DC) filed the complaint on behalf of Sunoco.

 

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• Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 2007-1448 (Fed. Cir., argued March 7, 2008)

     Update: Petersburg, Virginia-based Star Scientific, Inc., sued R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. for patent infringement in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland in 2001. A bench trial on the issue of the enforceability of the asserted patents was held in 2005.  On June 25, 2007, the District Court found Star’s patents to be unenforceable on the basis of inequitable conduct by Star’s attorneys during prosecution of Star’s patents before the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office.  Thereafter, Star characterized the decision as “stunning and totally without support in the record,” and concluded that “the opinion ignores significant portions of the record, distorts others, and spins a tale that is unrecognizable to those who attended the trial.” 

     On appeal, the Federal Circuit (Michel, Dyk, Schall) heard lengthy arguments on March 7, 2008, concerning the District Court’s judgment, which centered on the actions of five lawyers in four different law firms and how they acted in view of their knowledge of a key prior art memorandum—the Burton letter—which discusses features of the invention claimed in Star’s patents, and which was communicated to the inventor prior to his filing his first patent application.

   During the oral argument, the Federal Circuit Judges framed the inequitable conduct issue as follows:

“The issue here we’ve been discussing is intent. Is it possible to find the requisite level of intent without implicating the attorneys? In other words, assume for the moment that one were to come to the conclusion that the attorneys in this case, starting with the Sughrue firm through the Banner firm through the Crowell firm, acted in good faith, does that take away necessarily the determination of intent that is needed to support inequitable conduct?”

     Inequitable conduct--also referred to as fraud on the Patent Office--is often plead as a defense in patent infringement lawsuits. Typically, the defense involves allegations that individuals involved in prosecuting a patent application intentionally misrepresented information provided to the PTO by making false or misleading statements, or withheld material prior art from the PTO by not disclosing closely-related, or "material" publications or test data. Allegations of inequitable conduct by prosecuting attorneys, who are usually not parties to the case in which the allegations are raised, are viewed with interest, not only because allegations of inequitable conduct in court papers are often publicized in the media, but also because a finding of inequitable conduct by members of the patent bar can result in suspension. 35 U.S.C. § 32.

     Perhaps that is why Carter Phillips, lead counsel for Star Scientific, argued the issues on appeal as involving lawyer reputations:

“The District Court analyzed this case as if there was a rather substantial conspiracy among four quite reputable law firms [Sughrue, Mion, Banner & Witcoff, Paul Hastings, and Crowell]. And in making that determination, it was very critical to [the Judge’s] analysis that he says, and this is the quarantine portion of the analysis, and this is the linchpin of the District Court’s analysis: it is the isolation of the Banner firm—that’s the recipient [of the prosecution files]—the isolation of the Banner firm from predecessor counsel was part of an intentional effort to avoid tainting the Banner firm with Delmendo’s [Sughrue's] knowledge, with whatever concerns he may have had about this particular letter, the Burton letter. And then subsequently, the District Judge also says, the Court finds that if Star had not prevented contact between Delmendo and Rivard, Delmendo would have communicated his knowledge and information [to the Banner firm]. So that this entire analysis, predicated on the assumption that there is somehow a nefarious conspiracy going on here, is complete fabrication. There is no evidence that supports it. And yet it is the critical element for the District Court to finding intent.”

     At the conclusion of the argument, Judge Michel, in a somewhat unusual move but one underscoring the importance of this case, ordered the parties to submit additional briefs to clear up exactly what each of the lawyers who knew about the Burton letter said and did, and where that evidence is found in the record:

“Requesting from both counsel letter briefs not exceeding 10 pages on the factual guts of particularly with regarding to the position and activities of Delmendo and the others who’ve been mentioned here so we can trace the chain of what did each of these people say and where do we find it in the record. Because obviously great interest on our our part in understanding exactly what the evidence was so we can compare the evidence, the actual words of testimony, with  the findings that the District Judge made, which explicitly or implicitly have to rest on those bits of testimony.”

 

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• Nacre AS v. Silynx Communications, Inc., No. 07-cv-02676, filed Oct. 2, 2007.

     Update:  Rockville, MD-based Silynx Communications and Norway's Nacre AS have been facing off on all fronts in their battle to gain control of the U.S. military tactical hearing protection and communications headset market, including the intellectual property front. In September 2007, Nacre, which owns the QUIETPRO trademark, filed a trademark opposition proceeding against Silynx's QUIETOPS mark before the U.S. Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. That proceeding was stayed when, in October 2007, Nacre filed a trademark and patent infringement lawsuit against Silynx in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, which is pending (additional counsel for Nacre just recently motioned for pro hac admission to the Maryland court). In January 2008, Silynx lost its protest of an award from the Dept. of the Navy to Nacre to acquire a quantity of combat radio headsets from the company.

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• #16: Wolsey v. Tactical Medical Solutions, LLC, No. 1:2008cv00546; filed February 28, 2008; assigned to J. Quarles

    

     Plaintiffs Henry Garnet Wolsey and Althea Wolsey are residents of the United Kingdom, and the inventors of U.S. Patent No. 6,067,803 for “Cooling Pouch,” which they describe as being used for cool storage of vials containing medicine. Plaintiffs’ sell in the U.S. the Frio Wallet, a flat foldable storage device with pockets similar to FIG. 1 from the ‘803 patent.

     Plaintiffs allege that Tactical Medical Solutions, Inc., and Tactical Medical Solutions, LLC, both reportedly South Carolina entities, have infringed the ‘803 patent by selling the “I.V. Evaporative Cooling System” (IVECS™) to the U.S. Army Medical Research & Material Command, which is a Command organization headquartered at Ft. Dietrich, MD. Plaintiffs are seeking an injunction and unspecified monetary relief.

     Daniel Chemers and Sherry Flax of Saul Ewing (Baltimore) filed the complaint on behalf of the Plaintiffs.

• #17: Simon Sys., Inc. v. Corel Corp., No. 8:2008cv00568; filed March 3, 2008; assigned to J. Messitte

     Rockville, Maryland's Simon Systems, Inc., sued Corel Corp., which is based in Ontario, Canada, for infringement of SSI’s U.S. Patent No. 5,559,562, entitled “MPEG Editor Method and Apparatus.” SSI alleges that Corel has sold in Maryland, MPEG editing equipment that infringes the ‘562 patent, and further alleges that such sales were willful and deliberate. Damages are estimated at “well in excess of $1,500,000.”

     Daniel Ward of Ward & Ward, PLLC, filed the complaint on behalf of SSI.

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Today's lawsuit summaries involve patent and trademark issues (source: Justia). 

• #13: Pennzoil-Quaker State Co. v. Anton Schmidt, Jr., No. 8:08cv00430; filed February 15, 2008; assigned to J. Chasanow

     Pennzoil-Quaker State, a Delaware company based in Houston, TX, contends that it is owner of the PENNZOIL logo and related marks (used in commerce for the sale and promotion of lubricants and other petroleum-based products). Defendant Schmidt allegedly does business as and is the owner of Auto Lube, Inc., in Laurel, MD. According to the complaint, Pennzoil and Schmidt entered into a purchase and licenses agreement which provided for the display of the PENNZOIL mark and signs in Defendant’s Auto Lube facility. Pennzoil contends that Schmidt breached the agreement, and is now infringing the mark and logo. 

     Matthew Kirtland and Rena Scheinkman of Fulbright & Jaworski (Washington, DC) filed the complaint on behalf of Pennzoil.

• #14: United States Olympic Committee v. Olympic Supply, Inc., No. 8:08cv00496; filed February 25, 2008; assigned to J. Chasanow

     The USOC is a federally chartered corporation based in Colorado Springs, CO. Under the Olympic Sports Act, the USOC was granted the exclusive right to use the OLYMPIC marks in the United States (including OLYMPIC, OLYMPIAD, the five interlocking rings symbol, and others), and is the owner of the federally-registerd OLYMPIC mark.

     USOC’s complaint states that Defendant Olympic Supply, Inc. (d/b/a Olympic News), is a Maryland entity based in Capitol Heights, MD. The identities of Defendants Does 1-10 are unknown. Defendants are accused of using the OLYMPIC mark as part of a retail trade name despite demands by the USOC to cease and desist such action, in violation of the Olympic and Amateur Sports Act.

     Kevin Arthur and Ezra Gollogly of Kramon & Graham (Baltimore) filed the complaint on behalf of the USOC.

• #15: Nutramax Labs., Inc. v. Genesis Today, Inc., No. 1:2008cv00520; filed February 26, 2008; assigned to J. Davis

     Readers of this website may recall that Nutramax Laboratories is an Edgewood, MD, entity that “researches, develops, manufactures, markets, distributes, sells, and has sold, nutritional supplement products across the United States.” Its complaint alleges that it is the owner of U.S. Patent No. 6,797,289 for “Use of anabolic agents, anti-catabolic agents, antioxidant agents, and analgesics for protection, treatment and repair of connective tissues in humans and animals.” Claim 1 of the ‘289 patent covers a “synergistic combination of an aminosugar and avocado/soybean unsponifiables [ASU].” Glucosamine is an aminosugar. Nutramax alleges that it has sold Cosamin® ASU and Avoca ASU®.

     Defendant Genesis Today, Inc., a Texas corporation, and Defendant Swanson Health Products, Inc., a North Dakota corporation, are accused of infringing the ‘289 patent by selling “4JointHealth” (Genesis) and “Joint Formula w/Hyaluronic Acid” (Swanson), containing the claimed ingredients, and thereby directly competing with Nutramax’s products. Nutramax is seeking an injunction and unspecified monetary relief.

     Robert Bowie and Joshua Glikin of Bowie & Jensen, LLC (Towson) filed the complaint on behalf of Nutramax.

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Summary: The twelfth lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland in 2008 involves a familiar name to some in Baltimore: Frederick Bouchat.   

• #12:  Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens LP, No. 1:08-cv-00397, filed February 14, 2008

     The Baltimore Ravens changed their logo in 1999 to the raven bird with a "B," but before that, they used a "B" on a shield with wings and the word "Ravens," which the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland found infringed a design copyrighted by Frederick Bouchat in 1996 (see below). Bouchat, a Baltimore security guard in December 1995 when he drew his original "Flying B" design and sent it to the Baltimore Ravens, sued the Ravens and the National Football League Properties (NFLP) over their use and licensing of the "Shield B" logo, and won. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court decision (see related post here). 

   On February 14, 2008, Bouchat sued the Ravens again, as well as the National Football League (NFL), NFL Films, Inc., and The Baltimore Sun Company, alleging that defendants have and continue to sell, distribute, and publicly display the old "Shield B" logo in connection with, for example, season highlight films, promotional films shown at Ravens games, team game films, memorabilia, photographs, and, in the case of the Baltimore Sun, websites. Bouchat is seeking destruction of infringing materials, an injunction, and unspecified damages.

     Bouchat is represented by Daniel Doty of Schulman & Kaufman LLC, a Baltimore law firm.

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     The following lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland pits brand and generic drug makers (source: Justia).

• #7: Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Lupin Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 1:2008cv00239, filed January 28, 2008; assigned to J. Legg

     This Hatch-Waxman lawsuit involves Namenda® (memantine HCl). According to the complaint, plaintiff Forest Labs., Inc., a Delaware corporation based in New York, is the exclusive licensee of Orange Book-listed U.S. Patent No. 5,061,703. Plaintiff Forest Labs. Holdings, Ltd., is an Irish company based in Bermuda; plaintiffs Merz Pharma GmbH & Co. KGaA and Merz Pharma GmbH are German companies.

     Also according to the complaint, defendant Lupin Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a Virginia company based in Baltimore, MD, is the wholly-owned subsidiary and agent of Lupin Ltd., an Indian company based in Mumbai. Lupin Ltd. allegedly submitted, through its agent Lupin Pharma, an Abbreviated New Drug Application No. 90-051 to the FDA for approval to market generic Namenda®. It sent Forest the required notice of its ANDA submission on December 14, 2007.

     Plaintiff is asserting infringement of the ‘703 patent, and is seeking to enjoin Lupin from marketing its generic formulation before expiration of the '703 patent.

     Interestingly, plaintiffs also filed a concurrent lawsuit in the District Court for the District of Columbia because they claim not to be able to determine with certainty which one of Lupin, Inc., or Lupin Ltd. was the actual filer of the ANDA. This move was in anticipation of a jurisdictional challenge by Lupin (see related post here).

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     The sixth IP-related lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland in 2008 involves a trademark dispute (source: Justia). 

• #6: Flagstar Bank, FSB v. Fundstar Financial, LLC, No. 8:2008cv00206, filed January 24, 2008; assigned to J. Messitte

     Michigan-based Flagstar Bank allegedly owns federal trademarks FLAGSTAR and FLAGSTAR BANK (word and design), which it uses in connection with lending and banking services. Defendant Fundstar Financial, based in Germantown, MD, allegedly began using the marks FUNDSTAR and FUNDSTAR FINANCIAL (word and design), in connection with mortgage banking services in Maryland. Plaintiff Flagstar is suing for trademark infringement; false designation of origin or sponsorship, false advertising, and trade dress; and common law trademark infringement.

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     David Donoghue at the Chicago IP Lit. Blog reports today about a discovery matter in a Northern District of Illinois patent case: Se-Kure Controls, Inc. v. Diam USA, Inc., No. 06 C 4857, 2008 WL 169029 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 17, 2008) (Cox, Mag. J.). According to David, Magistrate Judge Cox "granted in part a motion to compel discovery regarding defendant’s advice of counsel defense. The Court ordered defendants to product a technical witness that provided opinion counsel information because opinion counsel was unable to remember the substance of conversations between the two. The Court also ordered production of communications between opinion counsel and trial counsel related to the patent in suit. These communications were within the scope of defendant’s waiver, even though a deposition of trial counsel would not have been allowed." 

     This opinion is one of many to be published post-Seagate, and further illustrates the extent to which courts will allow discovery once the opinion of counsel defense is raised by defendants in patent litigation matters. Click here for summaries of other post-Seagate cases.

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     If you are interested in learning the nuts-and-bolts of trying a patent case, join Maryland U.S. District Court Judges Marvin J. Garbis and André M. Davis, other judges, and a large faculty of litigators, in Scottsdale, AZ, on February 28-29, 2008, for Trial of a Patent Case. The live course, which will also be webcasted, is part of the 15th Annual Advanced ALI-ABA Course of Study for the Corporate Counsel and the Private Practitioner. Judges Garbis and Davis presided over a combined four patent lawsuits filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland in 2007. They also have a perspective on Maryland's comprehensive e-discovery protocol, which other jurisdictions have adopted. George F. Pappas, who is representing Microsoft in the Technology Patents lawsuit pending in the U.S. District Court for the District Maryland, will co-chair the program with Judge Garbis. 

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     A year ago, West Chester, OH-based Contech Stormwater Solutions sued Mount Airy, MD-based BaySaver Technologies, Inc. and AccuBid Excavation, Inc., for allegedly infringing its U.S. Patents Nos. 5,707,527 and 6,027,639 (see related post here). After finding in favor of defendants on the question of liability, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland considered defendants’ business tort, and patent invalidity and unenforceability counterclaims in connection with the parties’ summary judgment motions.

Rule 37(c)(1) Sanctions

     At the outset, the court limited defendants’ use of certain evidence as a sanction under Rule 37(c)(1), “because [defendants] failed timely to disclose prior art or the underlying basis for their invalidity claims, and because they failed to demonstrate causation and damages on their business tort claims.” In particular, the court found that,

"[Defendants] did not provide a claim chart or any reasoned analysis showing where in the prior art each element of each allegedly invalid claim is located. Defendants merely attached alleged prior art references to their Opposition without any explanation of why any claim of the asserted patents is invalid over the referenced prior art. Without more, [defendants] have quite simply failed to produce specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial, especially under a clear and convincing standard."

     Without evidence to support the counterclaims, the court granted plaintiff’s summary judgment motion.

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     As promised in my earlier post regarding In re Seagate, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007), below is a summary of cases citing the much talked about Federal Circuit opinion. This survey includes opinions published on or before January 31, 2008, but is not inclusive.

• Federal Circuit: "Under this [objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent] standard, both legitimate defenses to infringement claims and credible invalidity arguments demonstrate the lack of an objectively high likelihood that a party took actions constituting infringement of a valid patent." The court did not elaborate on the meanings of "legitimate" and "credible". Black & Decker, Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp. (Fed. Cir. 2008)
  
  
• E.D. New York: Motion to bifurcate liability and willfulness issues denied on several grounds, including the overlap of evidence between the two issues. Computer Assoc. Intl., Inc. v. Simple.com, Inc. (E.D.N.Y. 2007)
  
  
• N.D. Illinois: "Because willfulness depends on an infringer's prelitigation conduct, in most circumstances, communications of trial counsel have little, if any, relevance. Thus, trial counsel opinions and work product of trial counsel are not subject to waiver, absent exceptional circumstances." Se-Kure Controls, Inc. v. Diam USA, Inc. (N.D. Ill. 2008)
  
  
• N.D. Illinois: Knowledge of patentee's pending patent application at time of launching new product is not enough to demonstrate willfulness; determination generally is based on post-patent, rather than pre-patent conduct; failure to assert a noninfringement defense and reliance solely on an invalidity defense is not sufficient to establish defendant acted despite an objective likelihood of infringement. Trading Techs. Intl., Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc. (N.D. Ill. 2008)

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     By now, those who follow patent issues in this country will undoubtedly have heard of In Re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007), in which the Federal Circuit heightened the standard for establishing willful patent infringement to a recklessness standard, and clarified the scope of the waiver of attorney-client privilege and work product immunity with regard to opinions of counsel relied on by defendants accused of willfully infringing. Several courts have since addressed the Seagate opinion in some detail, including the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, which is presiding over the original Seagate matter (Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., No. 00-civ-5141). 

     In the Convolve case, Seagate opposed Convolve's claims of willful patent infringement by relying on an opinion generated by its engineering staff together with its in-house counsel and a patent agent (they also relied on outside counsel’s opinion). Convolve then moved for an order compelling Seagate to allow discovery from Seagate's in-house counsel. The court didn't buy Seagate’s argument that the opinion was simply an engineering report, and instead found that Seagate had waived the attorney-client privilege as to all documents within the scope of the waiver as defined in In re Echostar Communs. Corp. It ordered Seagate to produce not just emails concerning the in-house opinion, which Seagate previously had produced, but any letters, memorandum, conversations, or the like between the Seagate's attorney and his client, as well as any documents referencing the communications between attorney and client concerning the opinion.  Memorandum and Order (Jan. 22, 2008).

     This ruling would have been different had Seagate not conducted its own internal patent infringement investigation before engaging outside counsel, and then relied on that investigation to establish that its actions did not rise to the level of recklessness. Companies that use in-house employees to investigate patent infringement claims (which is common), and then help in-house attorneys to develop an opinion regarding patent infringement, should not expect documents and conversations about that investigation to remain protected under the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine, even if the company later procures and relies on an opinion from outside counsel. You just never know how far a judge will go with a waiver under In re Echostar.

     Check back later for a summary of what other courts are saying about In re Seagate.

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     I received a Tec Stretch Ear Warmer over the recent holiday season, just in time for last week's cold spell. Made by Baltimore-based 180s, the Tec Stretch product combines ear warmer and headphones in one simple device, so you can listen to your MP3 player and protect your ears from the cold at the same time. In addition to patents covering the ear warmer product, 180s has a portfolio containing over 50 utility and design patents covering a wide range of sports-related apparel and accessories. And it is not afraid to assert those patents: the company has filed no less than eight patent infringement lawsuits in just the last fours years. 

     Which leads me to today's lawsuit summary (source: Justia). 

• #5: 180s, Inc. et al v Gordini U.S.A., Inc., No. 1:2008cv00177, filed January 22, 2008

This patent and trade dress infringement lawsuit involves plaintiffs 180s, Inc. and 180s, LLC (reportedly the licensee of 180s' patents) and defendant Gordini U.S.A., Inc., a Vermont company based in Essex Junction, VT, which, according to its website, develops and manufactures cold weather apparel and accessories. The patents at issue are utility patent 6,978,483 and design patent D545,001; the trademark at issue is Registration No. 3,089,225 for the design shown below. 180s contends that Gordini's Lobz® earmuff product and packaging are similar to 180s' ear warmer product. In its complaint, 180s alleges patent infringement of the '483 and '001 patents, federal trade dress infringement of the '225 registration, and common law trade dress infringement. The company is seeking an injunction, undisclosed monetary damages, and a finding of willful infringement.

Cooley Godward Kronish LLP filed the complaint on behalf of 180s.

     Whether it is successful or not in this lawsuit, this case highlights how different forms of intellectual property protection--utility patents, design patents, and trade dress--can all be used in combination to protect various aspects of a single good or service.

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Summary: The U.S. District Court for Distict of Maryland denied motion to stay on abstention grounds in favor of a pending state court action in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, MD, pursuant to Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). In doing so, the Court found that Defendants had not overcome the “heavily weighted” balance in favor of retaining jurisdiction, and therefore Defendants had failed to establish the “extraordinary circumstances” necessary to justify Colorado River abstention. Memorandum Opinion published January 15, 2008.

Parallel proceedings

      This trademark dispute, captioned Extra Space Storage, LLC v. Maisel-Hollins Development Co. et al, No. 1:2007cv02351, involves two concurrent lawsuits arising out of the parties’ desire to use their respective service marks in Maryland.

     Extra Space registered its service mark, EXTRA SPACE STORAGE, with the United States Patent and Trademark Office in 1998 or 1999. Defendants’ predecessor in title registered its service mark, “EXTRA SPACE SELF STORAGE,” with the Maryland Office of the Secretary of State in 2003.

     On June 26, 2007, Maisel-Hollins filed its state court lawsuit against Extra Space Storage, a Delaware entity based in Salt Lake City, Utah. The lawsuit alleged violation of Maisel-Hollins’s common law and state registration rights.

     Extra Space filed its answer on September 5, 2007, but without counterclaims. Instead, also on September 5, 2007, Extra Space filed the above-captioned federal lawsuit, alleging infringement of its EXTRA SPACE STORAGE mark. Extra Space named the lone plaintiff in the state case, Maisel-Hollins, and five of its affiliates as Defendants.

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     In 2007, the major music recording companies, led by the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), filed more copyright lawsuits in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland than any other group or individual. RIAA accounted for 16 of the 30 copyright lawsuits filed last year (53%). In 2006, RIAA accounted for an estimated 22 of 54 copyright lawsuits (41%). All of the RIAA lawsuits involved individual defendants accused of illegally downloading or sharing copyrighted music. The 30 copyright lawsuits involved a total of 168 plaintiffs (64 unique entities/individuals). Of those 168 plaintiffs, 85 were RIAA members, including the following:

• Sony BMG Music Entertainment (plaintiff in all 16 of the RIAA lawsuits);
• UMG Recordings (plaintiff in 14 of the RIAA lawsuits)
• Arista Records (plaintiff in 12 lawsuits)
• BMG Music (12 lawsuits)
• Virgin Records America (9)
• Capitol Records (9)
• Warner Brothers Records (8)
• Interscope Records (8)

     Twelve U.S. District Court Judges presided over the 30 copyright lawsuits in 2007: Bennett (3), Blake (2), Chasanow (1), Cullinane (1), Davis (4), Dorr (1), Garbis (2), Legg (2), Messitte (6), Quarles (2), Titus (3), and Williams (3). All 6 of Judge Messitte's cases involved RIAA lawsuits (in 2006, Judge Messitte presided over an estimated 21 of the 22 RIAA lawsuits).

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     If you're in the D.C.-Maryland-Virginia area and would like to learn more about managing patent infringement litigation, don't forget about the 2008 Advanced Patent Law Institute being held in Alexandria, Virginia, starting today, January 10, 2008. My colleague, Keeto Sabharwal, a partner in Blank Rome’s Washington, DC, office, will be discussing the law of induced patent infringement tomorrow.  The session will include advice on how to effectively litigate a claim of active inducement from both the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s perspectives, and it will offer a discussion of the most recent federal circuit case law addressing the issue. Here is a link to the course for more information.

     Update:  The presentation mentioned above was switched in the schedule and presented this morning. If you're interested in a copy of the presentation materials, please email me.

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