Saying its Marks are Famous, Under Armour Sues to Protect Them

 Under Armour Registered Trademark        

          In separate complaints filed in the U.S. district court for the District of Maryland in March 2011, Baltimore, Maryland-based Under Armour, maker of athletic equipment and apparel, with more than a billion dollars in net revenues in 2010, contends its famous trademarks are being infringed.  According to its...          

complaints, Under Armour owns more than eighty federal trademarks and registration applications, most being formative marks having the word "Armour," with or without the UA logo, or UA logo marks with stylized characters.  Under Armour contends that its marks are famous and many are incontestable as to Under Armour's exclusive use.  Under Armour has also registered certain marks with Maryland's Secretary of State.

          In its first complaint, against Canadian defendants Armorline Marketing International, Armorsales, Inc., 54Blue, and Paul Abell, Under Armour alleges Defendants' use of ARMOR marks, logos, and domain names (e.g., armoruniverse.com) is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deceive in violation of the Lanham Act, and infringes and dilutes Under Armour's marks.  Under Armour also alleges that Defendants' use of their domain name constitutes cybersquatting under the Lanham Act.  Under Armour's state-law claims include trademark infringement under Md. Code Bus. Reg. Sec. 1-414 et seq., fraudulent use or imitation of trade name under Md. Code Bus. Reg. Sec. 1-415 et seq., and common law trademark infringement and unfair competition.

          In its second complaint, against Real Wear (U.S.A.), Inc. (allegedly doing business as Purple Armour) and Tiffani Denise Diggs Lewis, Under Armous alleges Defendants' use of its PURPLEARMOUR mark and name and purplearmour.net domain name breach a 2009 agreement, is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deceive in violation of the Lanham Act, constitutes trademark infringement, false advertising, dilutes Under Armour's marks, constitutes cybersquatting in violation of the Lanham Act, violates Maryland Regulations Sec. 1-414 and 1-415, and Maryland trademark common law.

No Fame In Mensa's Trademark, Court Finds

  • American Mensa, Ltd. v. Inpharmatica, Ltd. et al., No. 07-3283 (D. Md filed Dec. 6, 2007); assigned to J. Quarles

     In American Mensa v. Inpharmatic, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motion for summary judgment. In doing so, the court found in favor of Mensa on Defendants' motion for summary judgment of no trademark infringement or unfair competition because genuine issues of fact remained, but granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment of no trademark dilution because there was no evidence that Mensa's mark is famous.

     In June 2004, Inpharmatica applied for use of the ADMENSA mark for a variety of services. After the application was published for opposition, Mensa asked Inpharmatica to withdraw its application because the mark would damage Mensa; Inpharmatica refused. On November 22, 2006, Mensa filed an opposition to Inpharmatica’s application with the PTO’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. During discovery in the PTO proceeding, Mensa learned that Inpharmatica had begun using the ADMENSA mark in the U.S. On December 6, 2007, Mensa filed the present suit seeking an injunction and damages. On August 25, 2008, the Defendants moved for summary judgment on Mensa’s claims.

Trademark infringement and unfair competition

     Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act prohibits the use in commerce of a "reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale. . .or advertising of any goods or services . . . [that] is likely to cause confusion, or . . . mistake." § 1114(1).

     To prove trademark infringement or unfair competition, Mensa must show that (1) it owns a valid trademark; (2) the Defendants use a colorable imitation of the mark in commerce without Mensa’s consent; and (3) such use is likely to cause confusion. As to the issue of confusion, the court examined how the parties use their marks to determine the likelihood of confusion.

     Whether a mark is likely to cause confusion depends on several factors: (1) the strength or distinctiveness of the plaintiff’s mark; (2) the similarity of the marks; (3) the similarity of the goods or services the marks represent; (4) the similarity of the facilities the parties use in their business; (5) the similarity of the parties’ advertising; (6) the defendant’s intent; and (7) actual confusion. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 259-60 (4th Cir. 2007).

      After analyzing each factor, the court found that the Mensa Mark is strong. However, the court also found that the parties’ services are not related (Mensa is an organization for intelligent individuals, and the Defendants are in pharmaceutical research). Mensa’s support of scientific colloquia and some research does not make it sufficiently similar to the Defendants research. The court found that Mensa had provided no evidence of actual confusion. And, the relevant consumers are generally highly sophisticated.

     The court also found that there existed a genuine dispute about the aesthetic similarity of the marks, as well as the Defendants’ intent in creating the ADMENSA mark. Although Mensa’s inability to show actual confusion weighed strongly against infringement (the court found that the evidence of record "falls woefully short of showing actual confusion among consumers, and at best, it shows that some of Inpharmatica’s consumers draw a similarity between the names but fails to show any actual confusion as to whether Mensa and Inpharmatica are linked"), confusion is not required. Viewing the facts in Mensa’s favor, summary judgment was denied on the Lanham Act infringement and unfair competition claims and the Maryland common law infringement claim.

Dilution of Trademark

     Under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1), "the owner of a famous mark that is distinctive . . .shall be entitled to an injunction against another person who . . . [uses] a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of . . . actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury."

     To be famous for dilution purposes, the court said that a mark must be more distinctive and stronger than that required in an infringement claim. To prove a dilution claim, Mensa had to show that (1) the Mensa mark is famous and distinctive; (2) the Defendants use a mark in commerce that is diluting the Mensa mark; (3) similarity between the ADMENSA mark and the Mensa mark gives rise to an association between them; and (4) the association is likely to impair the distinctiveness of the Mensa mark or likely to harm its reputation. Louis Vuitton, 507 F.3d at 264-65.

     In this case, the court noted that the Trademark Dilution Revision Act (TDRA) significantly increased the difficulty of proving a dilution claim by requiring a mark to be famous to the general public. Unless a mark is a "household name" whose fame is not at all in doubt, it cannot support a dilution claim, the court wrote. Although Mensa has been mentioned in the media, it has spent little money on advertising and receives little revenue. The court said it is not a household name like those marks that have earned dilution protection, such as Hershey’s, Nike, Visa, and American Express. Judgment was granted to the Defendants on Mensa’s dilution claim.

    This case is set for an April 2009 trial.

Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog LLC

     In Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, __ F.3d ___ (4th Cir. Nov. 13, 2007), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court judgment that Nevada-based Haute Diggity Dog, LLC did not infringe Paris-based Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A.'s famous LOUIS VUITTON trademark by selling small imitations of handbags labeled "Chewy Vuiton" and that mimic LVM's LOUIS VUITTON handbags. In doing so, the Court found that, while the "Chewy Vuiton" dog toys undisputedly evoke LVM handbags of similar shape, design, and color, and use "CV" in lieu of the LV mark, and use other symbols and colors imitating LVM's Multicolor and Cherry designs, the "Chewy Vuiton" dog toys are successful parodies of LVM handbags and the LVM marks and trade dress used in connection with the marketing and sale of those handbags.

     LVM commenced an action against Haute Diggity Dog in 2002, alleging trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a), trademark dilution under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c), copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501, and related statutory and common law violations. To prove trademark infringement, LVM had to establish (1) that it owns a valid and protectable mark; (2) that Haute Diggity Dog used a "reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation" of that mark in commerce and without LVM’s consent; and (3) that Haute Diggity Dog’s use was likely to cause confusion. To determine whether the "Chewy Vuiton" product line created a likelihood of confusion, the Fourth Circuit considered the nonexclusive Pizzeria Uno factors (1) the strength or distinctiveness of the plaintiff’s mark; (2) the similarity of the two marks; (3) the similarity of the goods or services the marks identify; (4) the similarity of the facilities the two parties use in their businesses; (5) the similarity of the advertising used by the two parties; (6) the defendant’s intent; and (7) actual confusion.

     In reaching it's decision regarding the parody of LVM's handbags, the Court said:

"[T]he juxtaposition of the similar and dissimilar — the irreverent representation and the idealized image of an LVM handbag — immediately conveys a joking and amusing parody. The furry little "Chewy Vuiton" imitation, as something to be chewed by a dog, pokes fun at the elegance and expensiveness of a LOUIS VUITTON handbag, which must not be chewed by a dog. The LVM handbag is provided for the most elegant and well-to-do celebrity, to proudly display to the public and the press, whereas the imitation "Chewy Vuiton" "handbag" is designed to mock the celebrity and be used by a dog. The dog toy irreverently presents haute couture as an object for casual canine destruction. The satire is unmistakable. The dog toy is a comment on the rich and famous, on the LOUIS VUITTON name and related marks, and on conspicuous consumption in general. This parody is enhanced by the fact that "Chewy Vuiton" dog toys are sold with similar parodies of other famous and expensive brands — "Chewnel No. 5" targeting "Chanel No. 5"; "Dog Perignonn" targeting "Dom Perignon"; and "Sniffany & Co." targeting "Tiffany & Co."

     With regard to the Pizzeria Uno likelihood of confusion factors, the Court found that because LOUIS VUITTON is so strong a mark and so well recognized as a luxury handbag brand from LVM, consumers readily recognize that when they see a "Chewy Vuiton" pet toy, they see a parody. Thus, the strength of LVM’s marks did not help LVM establish a likelihood of confusion. The Court similarly found in favor of Haute Diggity Dog on the other factors:

"In sum, the likelihood-of-confusion factors substantially favor Haute Diggity Dog. But consideration of these factors is only a proxy for the ultimate statutory test of whether Haute Diggity Dog’s marketing, sale, and distribution of "Chewy Vuiton" dog toys is likely to cause confusion. Recognizing that "Chewy Vuiton" is an obvious parody and applying the Pizzeria Uno factors, we conclude that LVM has failed to demonstrate any likelihood of confusion."

Comments:

  • Cite to district court opinion: Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 464 F.
    Supp. 2d 495 (E.D. Va. 2006)

  • WSJ blog comment after the district court case in 2006