Cardin Adds Support to Intellectual Property Enforcement Bill

Posted on September 12, 2008 by Brian Wm. Higgins

     On September 10, 2008, Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD) added his support to S. 3325, the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights Act of 2008, one day before the Senate Judiciary ordered the bill "to be reported with amendments favorably." Cardin joins eight other co-sponsors of the legislation (Senators Leahy, Bayh, Cornyn, Hatch, Voinovich, Specter, Feinstein, and Whitehouse). Next stop for the bill in consideration by the entire Senate (once placed on the Senate Calendar).

  • Enforcement of copyright laws

     S.3325, introduced July 24, 2008, would authorize the U.S. Attorney General to commence a civil action against any person who engages in conduct constituting a criminal offense under the copyright laws, 17 U.S.C. § 506, upon proof of such conduct by a preponderance of the evidence (compared to the much high criminal standard, the preponderance standard is estimated to result in more enforcement of copyright laws). A person found liable may be subject to a civil penalty under section 504 which shall be in an amount equal to the amount which would be awarded under 18 U.S.C. 3663(a)(1)(B) (i.e., the amount of the loss sustained by each victim as a result of the offense, considering the financial resources of the defendant) and restitution to the copyright owner aggrieved by the conduct.

  • Enforcement of trademark laws

     S. 3325 would enhance remedies for trademark violations. Section 35(b) of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1117(b)) would require a court, in assessing damages for any violation of section 32(1)(a) of the Act, or or in a case involving use of a counterfeit mark or designation, to enter judgment for three times profits or damages, whichever amount is greater, together with attorney’s fee, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances. Treble damages and attorney's fees are authorized where the violation consists of:

(1) intentionally using a mark or designation, knowing such mark or designation is a counterfeit mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution of goods or services; or

(2) providing goods or services necessary to the commission of a violation specified in paragraph (1), with the intent that the recipient of the goods or services would put the goods or services to use in committing the violation.

     The court may also award prejudgment interest beginning on the date of the service of the claimant’s pleadings and ending on the date entry of judgment is made.

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

TTAB: Dont Overreach When Identifying Services Associated With One's Trademark

Posted on July 12, 2008 by Brian Wm. Higgins

     In Grand Canyon West Ranch v. Hualapai Tribe, TTAB No. 91162008 (June 30, 2008), the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board found that an applicant, not registrant, committed fraud on the Trademark Office when it represented to the Office that it provided services in association with its mark GRAND CANYON WEST that, in fact, it did not offer. 

     Applicant Hualapai Tribe ("People of the Tall Pine"), whose tribal lands border the Colorado River and Grand Canyon in the western portion of the Canyon, filed an application for the mark GRAND CANYON WEST for a variety of services under Section 1(a), App. Ser. No. 76484111. The examiner prosecuting the application issued an office action requesting further clarification as to the services associated with the mark. The applicant responded in kind, stating that it provided, among other services, horseback rides, bicycle tours, and tractor-based tram rides. During the publication phase, the mark was opposed by Grand Canyon West Ranch, which argued that the mark was merely descriptive, and that the applicant had committed fraud on the PTO by including services in the application that they were not, in fact, offering under the mark.

     The Board found that the mark was not merely descriptive. However, it agreed with Ranch's fraud argument. Specifically, the Board found that there was no evidence that applicant provided horseback rides, bicycle tours, or tractor-based tram rides, as identified in the application. The applicant argued that the error was inadvertent, that it was due to innocent and reasonable reliance on the examiner's instructions to applicant suggesting appropriate services. The Board said that it could not excuse the error. The applicant, it wrote, had an affirmative duty to correct the identification set forth in the examiner's amendment if it contained errors. 

      Acknowledgment: information for this post provided by Alain Lapter, Esq.

Tags: , , , , , , , , ,