Maryland Intellectual Property Law Blog : Maryland Intellectual Property Lawyer & Attorney : Brian Wm. Higgins : Serving Baltimore, Columbia, Frederick

     In Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., No. 06-2662 (D. Md. May 29, 2008), U.S. Chief Magistrate Judge Grimm describes the proper means for asserting that documents are protected or immune from discovery because of the attorney-client privilege or attorney work product doctrine. Judge Grimm's explanation comes at the end of his opinion in Victor Stanley, published two weeks ago.

The Issue

     Because a party responding to a Rule 34 request for the production of discovery is entitled to refuse to produce documents if they are privileged or work product protected, Judge Grimm pointed out that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that when doing so, the responding party must “describe the nature of the documents, communications, or tangible things not produced or disclosed--and do so in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the claim.” The most common way to do this, he wrote, is by using a privilege log, which identifies

1. Each document withheld,
2. Information regarding the nature of the privilege/protection claimed,
3. The name of the person making/receiving the communication,
4. The date and place of the communication, and
5. The document’s general subject matter.

What Really Happens?

     In actuality, Judge Grimm, who in his position as Magistrate referees all kinds of discovery disputes, found that lawyers infrequently provide all the basic information called for in a privilege log, and if they do, it is usually so cryptic that the log falls far short of its intended goal of providing sufficient information to the reviewing court to enable a determination to be made regarding the appropriateness of the privilege/protection asserted without resorting to extrinsic evidence or in camera review of the documents themselves. Few judges, he said, find that the privilege log is ever sufficient to make the discrete fact-findings needed to determine whether a privilege/protection was properly asserted and not waived.

What Should Lawyers Be Doing? 

     According to Judge Grimm, parties should be wary of filing a response to a Rule 34 document production request that asserts privilege/protection as a basis for refusing to make requested production without having a factual basis to support each element of each privilege/protection claimed for each document withheld, because doing so is a sanctionable violation.

     Insuring that a privilege or protection claim is properly asserted in the first instance and maintained thereafter involves a several step process, Judge Grimm wrote.

(1)  First, pursuant to FRCP 26(b) (5), the party asserting privilege/protection must do so with particularity for each document, or category of documents, for which privilege/protection is claimed.

(2)  After that, if the requesting party challenges the sufficiency of the assertion of privilege/protection, the asserting party may no longer rest on the privilege log, but bears the burden of establishing an evidentiary basis–by affidavit, deposition transcript, or other evidence– for each element of each privilege/protection claimed for each document or category of document. A failure to do so warrants a ruling that the documents must be produced because of the failure of the asserting party to meet its burden.

(3)  If the asserting party makes this showing, and the requesting party still contests the assertion of privilege/protection, then the dispute is ready to submit to the court, which, after looking at the evidentiary support offered by the asserting party, can either rule on the merits of the claim or order that the disputed documents be produced for in camera inspection.

Result

     In Victor Stanley, Judge Grimm said that had he not ruled that Defendant's 165 inadvertently produced documents waived the privilege/protection status of the documents, then the effect of a failure by the Defendants to comply with the court’s order regarding the proper manner in which to assert privilege/protection would have warranted an order to produce the materials for failure to carry the burden of demonstrating the existence of the privilege/protection claimed. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

     U.S. Chief Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm is a leading jurist in the field of electronic discovery. In Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., No. 06-2662 (D. Md. May 29, 2008), Judge Grimm discusses the approach the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland may take when deciding whether the inadvertent production to an adversary of attorney-client privileged or work-product protected materials constitutes a waiver.

Background

     In Victor, the parties entered into a joint protocol to search and retrieve relevant ESI responsive to Plaintiff’s Rule 34 requests.  After the protocol was used to retrieve responsive ESI, Defendants reviewed the documents to locate any that were privileged or attorney work-product prior to production to Plaintiff. Defendants had previously expressed concern that privilege review of the responsive documents would delay production unnecessarily and cause undue expense. To address this concern, Defendants gave their computer forensics expert a list of keywords to be used to search and retrieve privileged/protected documents. However, Defendants also acknowledged the possibility of inadvertent disclosure of privileged/protected documents, and requested that the court approve a “clawback agreement.” Later, Defendants notified the court that because Judge Garbis had extended the discovery deadline by four months, Defendants would be able to conduct a document-by-document privilege review, thereby making a clawback agreement unnecessary.

     After receiving Defendants’ ESI production in September, 2007, Plaintiff began their review of the materials. They soon discovered documents that potentially were privileged or work-product protected, and immediately segregated this information and notified Defendants.

Applicable Law

     As noted by Judge Grimm, courts have taken three different approaches when considering inadvertent production. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to decide which approach it will follow, although individual district courts within the circuit, Grimm notes, have adopted the intermediate balancing approach. Under the intermediate approach, the court balances a number of factors to determine whether the producing party exercised reasonable care under the circumstances to prevent against disclosure of privileged/protected information, and if so, there is no waiver. The intermediate test requires the court to balance the following factors to determine whether inadvertent production of attorney-client privileged materials waives the privilege:

(1) the reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure;

(2) the number of inadvertent disclosures;

(3) the extent of the disclosures;

(4) any delay in measures taken to rectify the disclosure; and

(5) overriding interests in injustice.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Summary:  Don't get too comfortable with Seagate's "objective recklessness" standard for determining willfulness in patent litigation: the Patent Reform Act of 2007 could change everything.

     35 U.S.C. § 284, enacted in 1952, provides that a court "may increase damages up to three times the amount found or assessed" in the case of willful patent infringement. In 1983, the Federal Circuit established the standard for evaluating willfulness: 

“Where . . . a potential infringer has actual notice of another’s patent rights, he has an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine whether or not he is infringing. Such an affirmative duty includes, inter alia, the duty to seek and obtain competent legal advice from counsel before the initiation of any possible infringing activity.”

Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (Fed. Cir. 1983)(emphasis added).  Thus, an accused infringer could establish that its continued accused activities were done in good faith if it reasonably relied on advice from counsel. The duty of care standard survived until just recently, when the Federal Circuit overruled the standard and held that:

"Proof of willful infringement permitting enhanced damages requires at least a showing of objective recklessness." 

In re Seagate Technology, LLC, Civ. No. 830 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Newman, J., Garjarsa, J., concurring).  Under Seagate, a patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence "that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent."  Once the threshold objective standard is satisfied, the patentee "must also demonstrate that this objectively-defined risk (determined by the record developed in the infringement proceeding) was either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer." According to the Federal Circuit, the state of mind of the accused infringer is not relevant to this objective inquiry.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link